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We examine the effect of financial openness on the development of financial systems 
in a panel of 35 emerging markets during the period of 1976 to 2003. A group of 
indicators including variables from banking sector, stock market, and national capital 
accounts are used as measures of financial openness and financial development. In 
addition, aggregate index measures are developed to incorporate information from 
different areas of the financial system. Our empirical results generally suggest that 
financial openness is the key determinant of cross-country differences in the 
development of financial systems. When testing financial openness against the 
development of the banking sector and stock market separately, we found strong and 
robust evidence that this link between openness and development exists in stock 
markets. Although a similar link is sometimes found with banking sectors, it is not 
robust to different indicators of financial openness and model specifications. 
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  11. Introduction 
 
In the aftermath of emerging market currency crises, first Mexico in 1994 then 
Southeast Asia in 1997 and Russia in 1998, researchers and policy makers have 
debated on the role of foreign capital and the effects of financial liberalization (stock 
market or capital account) on economic stability and growth. A large line of research 
work provide evidence that development of a financial system is a key driver of 
economic growth [for example, Levine (1997, 2005); King and Levine (1993); Levine 
et al. (2000); Beck et al. (2000); Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1996); Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (1996); and Rajan and Zingales (2001)]. It is likely that financial 
openness, as the major form of financial liberalization, increases economic growth 
through its effect on financial development. In this paper, we examine the effects of 
emerging markets financial liberalization on financial development.  
 
Financial systems in developed economies are frequently dominated by stock markets, 
however this is not the case in most emerging markets where stock markets are less 
developed, may be inefficient and corporate governance is weak. Financial openness 
in this study is defined as allowing foreign ownership of equity, and the facilitation 
and encouragement of international capital flows. Financial development is generally 
defined as increasing the efficiency of allocating financial resources and monitoring 
capital projects, through encouraging competition and increasing the importance of 
the financial system. In other words, development is about structure, size and 
efficiency of a financial system. Theory suggests financial liberalization can lead to 
development of financial systems through several channels. The liberalization process 
usually increases the efficiency of the financial system by weeding out inefficient 
financial institutions, and creating greater pressure for a reform of the financial 
infrastructure (Chinn and Ito 2005; Claesens et al. 2001; Stulz 1999; Stiglitz 2000). 
Such an improvement in financial infrastructure may alleviate information asymmetry, 
decrease adverse selection and moral hazard, and raise the availability of finance. 
Removing capital controls allows domestic and foreign investors to hold more 
diversified portfolios, the cost of capital decreases when an emerging market moves 
from segmentation to integration into the world (Bekaert and Harvey 2000, 2001; 
Henry 2000). 
  2This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, empirical findings in the 
existing literature are mostly driven by data from developed countries. There has been 
less analysis of emerging markets. Our sample includes panel data of 35 major 
emerging markets that have significant stock markets during the period of 1976 to 
2003. Second, most empirical work focuses on a particular sector of the financial 
system (bank or stock market), our approach look at a larger number of indicators that 
are used as proxies of financial openness and financial development including 
indicators of the banking system, stock market, and international capital flows. Third, 
our measures of financial openness and financial development are not subjective 
scores assigned based on qualitative information. We develop index measures that 
aggregate groups of indicators based on principal component analysis, and in this way 
our index measures are determined by the inner relationship of actual financial and 
economic variables. Fourth, our empirical results are robust to different ways of 
aggregating information that indicating the degree of financial openness and financial 
development, to both static and dynamic panel data models, and to different 
estimation methods involved.  
 
We first test the effects of financial openness on financial development with 
individual openness measures, and then use the aggregate measures of financial 
openness. Our empirical results generally suggest that financial openness is the key 
determinant of cross-country differences in development of the financial system. 
When testing financial openness against the development of the banking sector and 
stock market separately, we found strong and robust evidence that this link between 
openness and development exists in stock markets. Although a similar link is 
sometimes found with banking sectors, it is not robust to different indicators of 
financial openness and model specifications. It is possible that some of our financial 
openness indicators are inappropriate for measuring banking sector openness.  
 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. 
Section 3 provides an introduction to our data and measures (indicators) of financial 
openness and financial development, a brief description of our data and aggregate 
index measures is included. Section 4 discusses our empirical models and estimation 
procedures. Section 5 discusses our test results in details. Section 6 summarises our 
findings.  
  32. Related Literature  
 
In the development literature, financial liberalization often refers to domestic financial 
liberalization, which includes banking sector reforms, and even privatizations. 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) study the effects of financial liberalization on 
interest rates and growth, and liberalization refers to the removal of domestic financial 
repression on banking sector, for instance, interest rates. Beim and Calomiris (2001) 
define financial liberalization as some combination of the following six kinds of 
constraints relaxation, mainly concern the banking system: elimination of interest rate 
controls; lowering of bank reserve requirements; reduction of government interference 
in banks’ lending decisions; privatization of nationalized banks, introduction of 
foreign bank competition, facilitation and encouragement of capital inflows. 
 
Many recent studies refer to financial openness as the major form of financial 
liberalization. The other form of financial liberalization, the so called domestic bank 
liberalization involving the removal of government repression on domestic banks, is 
often referred to as financial development. Bekaert (1995) define financial 
liberalization as the lowering of foreign investment barriers. Bekaert and Harvey 
(2000) define financial liberalization as allowing inward and outward foreign equity 
investment. Henry (2003) argues that strictly speaking, equity market liberalization is 
a specific type of capital account liberalization, which is the decision to allow capital 
in all forms to move freely in and out of the domestic market. There are other forms 
of financial openness relating to bond market, banking sector and foreign exchange 
reforms. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) capital account openness measure 
combines all of these together in a zero/one variable. The data are from the IMF’s 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). 
Quinn (1997) has recently compiled a composite measure of financial regulation that 
ranges from 0 to 14, with 14 representing the least regulated and most open regime. 
The bulk of the index is based upon Quinn’s coding of the qualitative information 
contained in the various issues of AREAER. Chinn and Ito (2002) create and utilize a 
new index based on the IMF measures of exchange restrictions that incorporates a 
measure of the intensity of capital controls. Edison and Warnock (2001) present a 
readily available monthly measure of the intensity of capital controls and also equity 
  4market liberalization across 29 emerging market countries that is based on the degree 
of restrictions on foreign ownership of equities. Here the degree of stock market 
liberalization equals the market capitalization  of country i’s IFC Investible Index 
divided by the market capitalization of it’s IFC Global Index,  / it it MCIFCI MCIFCG . 
This is based on data from Standard & Poor's Emerging Markets Database (EMDB). 
 
Many researchers attempt to date financial liberalization (typically stock market 
liberalization), and treat liberalization as one-off event, and adopt an event study 
approach to examine the effects of liberalization on equity market. However, defining 
the liberalization date is difficult. The liberalization process is gradual and extremely 
complex, capital controls may not have been effective, indirect access may already 
exist through ADR listing or country fund, official liberalization may not be credible, 
and other factors may segment the market, such as investment barriers. Henry (2000) 
define liberalization dates as the first month with a verifiable occurrence of any of the 
following: liberalization by policy decree, establishment of the first country fund, or 
an increase in the investibility index  / it it MCIFCI MCIFCG   of Edison, Warnock 
(2001) of at least 10 percent. Bekaert and Harvey (2000) define liberalizations as the 
first of the following dates: official regulatory changes, the introduction of depositary 
receipts and country funds, and structural breaks in equity capital flows to the 
emerging markets. Bekaert, Harvey, Lumsdaine (2002) offer an improved approach 
that results in market liberalization dates, with confidence intervals, for 20 countries. 
Their methodology exploits the new technique of Bai et al. (1998) to find endogenous 
break points for the VAR parameters. 
 
Similar to dating liberalization, Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) construct a new 
comprehensive chronology of financial liberalization in 28 countries for the period 
January 1973-June 1999. It captures various aspects of liberalization, namely the 
deregulation of the capital account, the domestic financial sector, and the stock market. 
For each sector, the chronology identifies three regimes: “fully liberalized,” “partially 
liberalized,” and “repressed.” A country is considered to be fully liberalized when at 
least two sectors are fully liberalized and the third one is partially liberalized. A 
country is classified as partially liberalized when at least two sectors are partially 
liberalized. 
  5Typically, in the event study approach, the authors perform panel regressions of 
dependent variables (for instance, GDP growth rate and cost of capital) on a 
liberalization dummy and some continuous control variable proxy for other economic 
reforms.  Stock market liberalization is part of a general process that involves 
substantial macroeconomic reforms such as inflation stabilization and trade 
liberalization. Henry (2003) argues that the asymmetric treatment (dummy versus 
continuous variables) of the economic reforms potentially makes empirical 
conclusions unreliable.  
 
The literature examining the link between financial liberalization and financial 
development is fairly small compared with the large body of work investigating the 
link between finance and growth [for example, Levine (1991); King and Levine 
(1993); Levine and Zervos (1996, 1998); Levine et al. (2000); Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1996); and Rajan and Zingales (2001)]; Bekaert, Harvey, Lumsdaine 
(2002, 2003)]. De Gregorio (1998) examines the related question of whether 
economies exhibiting greater financial integration experience greater financial 
development. Instead of relying upon financial restrictions of a regulatory nature, he 
investigates the effect of lack of financial integration characterized by deviations from 
the international arbitrage pricing model (IAPM) of Levine and Zervos (1995) and the 
international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) of Levine and Zervos (1998). 
Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) present evidence that opening 
banking markets improves the functioning of national banking systems and the quality 
of financial services, with positive implications for banking customers and lower 
profitability of domestic banks. Laeven (2000) examines whether the liberalisation of 
the banking sector may help reduce financial restrictions and the external cost of 
capital premium, thus stimulating investment and financial development. 
 
Klein and Olivei (2001) examine a cross-section of 87 industrialized and less 
developed countries over the 1976-1995 periods. Their measures of financial 
development include the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, the proportion of financial 
intermediates’ claims on the private sector to GDP, and the ratio of private bank to 
private plus central bank assets. For financial openness, Klein and Olivei use the most 
common measure of capital account liberalization– the IMF’s indicator variable on 
  6capital account restrictions from the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Klein and Olivei find a positive relationship 
between capital account liberalization and financial development. However, one 
marked and notable aspect of their results is that the identified correlation is driven 
entirely by the developed countries in their sample. In other words, there is no 
detectable relationship between liberalization and development for the less developed 
countries. Klein and Olivei conjecture that this result obtains because the less 
developed countries were latecomers to the liberalization game; hence it may merely 
be the case that the effects of liberalization have not yet been felt, and time will tell. 
 
More recently, Chinn and Ito (2002) create and utilize a new index that incorporates a 
measure of the intensity of capital controls, based on the IMF measures. They 
examine the empirical relationship between capital controls and the financial 
development of credit and equity markets. A substantially broader set of proxy 
measures of financial development are investigated. The results suggest that the rate 
of financial development, as measured by private credit creation and stock market 
activity, is linked to the existence of capital controls. However, the strength of this 
relationship varies with the empirical measure used, and the level of development. 
These results also suggest that only in an environment characterized by a combination 
of a higher level of legal and institutional development will the link between financial 
openness and financial development be readily detectable. A disaggregated analysis 
indicates that in emerging markets the most important components of these legal 
factors are the levels of shareholder protection and of accounting standards. 
 
Chinn and Ito (2005) extend this work focusing on the links between capital account 
liberalization, legal and institutional development, and financial development, 
especially that in equity markets. In a panel data analysis encompassing 108 countries 
and twenty years ranging from 1980 to 2000, they explore several dimensions of the 
financial sector. The empirical results suggest that a higher level of financial openness 
contributes to the development of equity markets only if a threshold level of general 
legal systems and institutions is attained. Among emerging market countries, a higher 
level of bureaucratic quality and law and order, as well as the lower levels of 
corruption, increases the effect of financial openness on the development of equity 
markets. In examining the issue of the sequencing, they find that trade openness is 
  7found to be a precondition for capital account liberalization. The findings also indicate 
that the development in the banking sector is a precondition for equity market 
development, and that the developments in these two types of financial markets have 
synergistic effects. 
 
The difficulties of measuring the degree financial openness and financial development 
have been challenging research works in this area. First, capital account openness 
measures or index measures of financial liberalization are usually a scoring system 
that is in part subjective. Second, financial openness and financial development exits 
in all areas of the financial system, proper measures that incorporate different 
dimensions of the financial system are needed. And third, given the relative 
importance of foreign direct investment compared with portfolio investment in many 
emerging economies such as China and India, the importance of foreign direct 
investment needs to be taken into account. One of the main contributions of this paper 
this that our measures of financial openness and financial development are not 
subjective scores assigned based on qualitative information. We develop index 
measures that aggregate groups of indicators based on principal component analysis, 
and in this way our index measures are determined by the inner relationship of actual 
financial and economic variables.  
 
 
3. Measures of Financial Openness and Financial Development 
 
We discuss individual indicators of financial openness and financial development, and 
then construct aggregate index measures with different groups of individual indicators. 




Indicators (Measures) of Financial Openness
2
 
                                                 
2 Ideally, foreign vs. domestic ownership can be suitable banking system openness indicator, 
however data are only available for a small number of emerging economies and limited period. 
  8Openness of stock market is measured with: 1. Market capitalization of IFC Investible 
index to IFC Global index; 2. Number of firms in IFC Investible index to IFC Global 
index. Data obtained from Standard & Poor's Emerging Markets Data Base (EMDB), 
monthly available. The first foreign investibility ratio computed with market 
capitalization is developed by Edison, Warnock (2001), and is widely used in the 
stock market liberalization literature as proxy variable.  
 
Openness to foreign direct investment is measured with Gross foreign direct 
investment to GDP.  Data obtained from World Bank online database, available 
annually. Gross foreign direct investment is the sum of the absolute values of inflows 
and outflows of foreign direct investment recorded in the balance of payments 
financial account. It includes equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term 
capital, and short-term capital. This indicator differs from the standard measure of 
foreign direct investment, which captures only inward investment. The indicator is 
calculated as a ratio to GDP in U.S. dollars.  
 
The fourth openness measure, related to control of capital flows, is Gross private 
capital flows to GDP. Data obtained from World Bank online database, available 
annually. Gross private capital flows are the sum of the absolute values of direct, 
portfolio, and other investment inflows and outflows recorded in the balance of 
payments financial account, excluding changes in the assets and liabilities of 
monetary authorities and general government. The indicator is calculated as a ratio to 
GDP in U.S. dollars.  
 
Indicators (Measures) of Financial Development 
 
Banking system development indicators: 
 
Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks and Other Financial Institutions to GDP: 
equals claims on the private sector by deposit money banks and other non-bank 
financial institutions divided by GDP, available from financial development and 
structure database, reported annually. This measure isolates credit issued to the private 
sector as opposed to credit issued to governments and public enterprises. Furthermore, 
  9it concentrates on credit issued by intermediaries other than the central bank. It is a 
measure of the intensity of government interference in bank lending decisions.  
 
Deposit Money vs. Central Bank Assets: measures the size of deposit money banks 
relative to central banks, reflects the importance of private lending compared with 
government lending. Data is available from financial development and structure 
database, reported annually. This measure equals the ratio of deposit money banks 
assets and the sum of deposit money and central bank assets. Deposit money bank 
comprises all financial institutions that have liabilities in the form of deposits 
transferable by check or otherwise usable in making payments.  
 
Total Bank Assets to GDP: a standard measure of financial depth, computed based on 
data from financial development and structure database, annual frequency.  
 
Liquid liabilities to GDP: a measure of the absolute size of the banking sector based 
on liabilities, it equals currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks 
and other financial intermediaries divided by GDP. This is the broadest available 
indicator of financial intermediations, since it includes all financial sectors. It is a 
typical measure of financial “depth” and thus of the overall size of the financial sector.  
 
Stock market development indicators: 
 
As an indicator of the size of the stock market, we use the stock market capitalization 
to GDP ratio which equals the value of listed shares divided by GDP. To measure the 
activity or liquidity of the stock markets, we use stock market total value traded to 
GDP, which is defined as total shares traded on the stock market exchange divided by 
GDP. We use the stock market turnover ratio as an efficiency indicator of stock 
markets, it is defined as the ratio of the value of total shares traded and market 
capitalization. It measures the activity or liquidity of a stock market relative to its size. 
A small but active stock market will have a high turnover ratio whereas a large, while 
less liquid stock market will have a low turnover ratio. Data is reported annually on 
financial development and structure database. 
 
  10Table 1 summarizes our financial openness and financial development indicators. 
Panel A and C report descriptive statistics of our indicators. Pairwise correlation 
coefficients of our financial openness indicators are reported in panel B, as expected 
our openness indicators are positively correlated, and the highest two correlations are 
correlation between the two types of stock market investibility ratios and correlation 
between foreign direct investment and private capital flows. Pairwise correlation 
coefficients of our financial development indicators are reported in panel D. Related 
literature generally suggest that all our financial development indicators should be 
positively related to the degree of financial development, and that we may expect the 




We apply principal component analysis (PCA) in order to aggregate information 
contained in groups of financial openness and financial development indicators. Our 
index measures are not subjective measures produced by a scoring system. Principal 
component analysis is usually used as a variable reduction method, or to detect 
structure in the relationships between variables. The information on a group of 
variables is then summarized by a number of principal components that are mutually 
independent. Formally, this is defined by a vector of weights  12 ( , ,..., ) N α αα α =  on 
the (standardized) indicators 
'
12 ( , ,..., ) N X XX X =  such  that  X α  has  the  maximum 
variance for any possible combination of weights, subject to the constraint 
that . 
' 1 αα =
 
In this study, we use only the first principal component as the aggregate index 
measure of financial openness or financial development. We score the first principal 
component of four individual indicators of openness described above, and define it as 
the index measure of financial openness (FO). With the two types of stock market 
investibility ratios we also score a stock market openness index (SMO). Similarly, the 
index measure of financial development (FD) is the first principal component of all 
individual measures of development. I also score similar index measures for the 
banking sector and stock market development, namely BD and SMD. Results of 
principal components analysis are reported in table 2.  
  11In order to score the first principal component, all individual measures need to be 
available. The sample obtained on financial openness indices is smaller than 
development indices due to short history of emerging stock markets, annual frequency 
and missing data. On average the first principal component captures 55% - 75% of the 
total variation of individual measures. FO captures 53% of the total variation of 4 
individual indicators of financial openness; FD captures 56% of the total variation of 
7 individual indicators of financial development. The stock market openness index 
(SMO) captures 75% of the total variations of the two foreign investibility ratios. 
When performing principal component analysis on only two variables, the first 
principal component is the average of the two variables after being standardized. 
Similarly, bank development index (BD) and stock market development index (SMD) 
captures 67% and 74% of the total variations of individual indicators.   
 
Eigenvectors of the first principal component are also reported in table 2, which are 
the weights on individual standardized measures when scoring the first principal 
component. The signs of eigenvectors further convince us of the positive relationships 
between individual indicators and the latent variables (financial openness or financial 
development). We observe that the four individual measures of financial openness are 
all positively associated with the first principal index financial openness (FO). Data 
also suggest financial development is associated with higher private credit and more 
competition; size and liquidity of both banking sector and stock market increase. 
Constructing index measures of financial openness and development has yielded 
sensible results. These eigenvectors also suggest that the loading or weighting of each 
individual measure when extracting the first principal component are similar, and that 
they all related to the latent variable financial openness or development. Given most 
of the correlation coefficients are around 0.4, using any single measure to study 
financial openness or development potentially causes bias due to measurement error.  
 
Other principal components are not used for 2 reasons. First, we do not find a clear 
structure, the loading of each variable on the first principal component are in general 
close. In other words, the correlations between each variable with the latent variable, 
financial openness or financial development, are similar. This implies that each 
individual measure reflects the same factor to a similar degree. Second, it is unclear 
what other components underline (or what other latent variables are) especially when 
  12the methodology assumes components are independent of each other, and 
inconsistencies will arise when these components actually capture information other 
than overall degree of financial openness or financial development.  
 
The strength of constructing index measures using principal component analysis is 
that the index weights on individual measures are produced automatically depending 
on the inner correlations of individual measures. The weakness of such methods 
comes from the nature of data on emerging economies. As discussed, in order to 
produce the first principal component, all individual measures need to be available. 
Due to the large number of missing values for many of the individual measures, the 
number of observations in principal component analysis may be much less than the 
average observations of individual measures. Hence the sample of first principal 
component values produced for further empirical analysis is also small, this 
potentially causes sampling biases. Our results suggest this is particularly problematic 
for our financial openness index (FO). We suggest an alternative approach to deal 
with the problem --- averaging all available standardized indicators of financial 
openness. This creates our equally weighted financial openness measure EFO. 
Observation obtained with this method is doubled compared with first principal 
component indices. The main problems of EFO index is that if data availability from 
different countries is very different, such index measures may potentially measure 
different things. But at least two facts from principal component analysis support this 
method. First, the signs of eigenvectors on the first principal component, or the 
correlation between individual indicators and the first principal component justify the 
signs in the averaging. Second, the values of eigenvectors are in general close, 
justifying equal weightings. We include equally weighted index measures in our study 
also for the purpose of testing robustness of results.  
 
Panel C of table 2 reports pairwise correlations of financial openness and financial 
development indices produced with principal component analysis or equal weightings. 
The equally weighted financial openness index (EFO) and first principal component 
index (FO) are almost perfectly correlated. Both Bank development index (BD) and 
stock market development index (SMD) are highly and positively correlated (0.92, 
0.86) with overall development of financial system (FD). Bank development (BD) and 
stock market development (SMD) are positively correlated with correlation equals to 
  130.59. Financial openness indices are all positively correlated with financial 
development indices as we have expected, although the correlations are generally 




We include the following variables as controls in our regression models: 
 
Country Risk, this is measured by the natural log value of International Country Risk 
Guide’s (ICRG) country risk composite score. The International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) rating comprises 22 risk components in three subcategories of risk: political, 
financial, and economic. The composite scores, ranging from zero to 100, higher 
scores are associated with lower risks. Annual Data is available from World Bank 
online database. Appendix 2 provides 22 risk components in the ICRG system. 
 
We use ICRG composite score as an aggregate control variable for institutional, legal, 
policy, and economic factors that may determine financial development. Empirical 
research on potential determinants of financial development has been considerable. A 
number of ICRG risk components are themselves considered important determinants 
of financial development, for instance, government stability, corruption, law and order, 
bureaucracy quality, democratic accountability, exchange rate stability, and inflation 
rate. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) have made a significant contribution to this topic 
concerning the legal determinants of financial development. Mayer and Sussman 
(2001) emphasize that regulations concerning information disclosure, accounting 
standards, permissible practice of banks and deposit insurance do appear to have 
material effects on financial development. Beck et al. (2003) address how institutions 
are important for financial development. Rajan and Zingales (2003)’s interest groups 
theory argues that politics matter for financial development. Huybens and Smith 
(1999) theoretically and Boyd, Levine and Smith (2001) empirically investigate the 
effects of inflation on financial development. 
 
Trade openness, measured by import plus export as percentage of GDP, annual data 
obtained from World Bank online database. Some recent work has supported the view 
that openness to external trade tend to boost financial development (Do and 
  14Levchenko, 2004; Huang and Temple, 2005). GDP Growth rate and GDP per capita 
(constant 2000 US$), available form World Bank, GDP growth rate and natural 
logarithm of real per capita GDP are used as control variables for demand of finance, 
as in Rajan and Zingales (2003).  
 
4. Panel Data Models and Methods
 
Static Panel Data Models 
 




it i it j jit it
j
DEV FO Control t α βλ δ
=
=+ + ++ ∑ ξ , t = 1, 2 ... T.            (4.1) 
 
•  : financial development index measures;  it DEV
•  : financial openness measures (individual indicator or indices);  it FO
•   is the group of control, including:  j Control
1.  : (Import + Export)/GDP;  it Trade
2.  it ICRG : Natural Logarithms of International Country Risk Guide’s 
(ICRG) country risk composite score; 
3.  : GDP growth rate;  it GDPG
4.  : Natural Logarithms of real per capita GDP;  it PCGDP
•  t = 1, 2…T, it controls for time trend in variables. 
 
i α  captures country effects, control for unobserved heterogeneity, it is different across 
countries and fixed through time; the coefficientβ  captures the effects of financial 
openness on development;   is the group of control variables which include 
, 
j Control
it Trade it ICRG , ,  . The index i  refers to the unit of observation 
(emerging market), t refers to the time period. 
it GDPG it PCGDP
it ξ  is a disturbance term assumed to 
satisfy the Gauss–Markov conditions. A trend term t has been introduced to allow for 
  15a shift of the intercept over time.  t: control for the time trend in variables. For 
simplicity, we assume constant rate of change for all time periods and all countries.  
 
The main approaches used to deal with (eliminate) unobserved heterogeneity in our 
study is the within-group fixed effects estimator and first differencing. In the first 
version, the mean values of the variables in the observations on a given country are 
calculated and subtracted from the data for that country. In view of (4.1), we obtain: 
 
1
() ( ) ( )
k
it it jit it it it j jit it
j
DEV DEV FO FO Control Control t t β λδ
=
−= − + − + − + − ∑ ξ ξ (4.2) 
 
and the unobserved effect disappears. This within group estimator assumes 
explanatory variables are correlated with unobserved group effects i α , and for this 
estimator to be unbiased, explanatory variables needs to be uncorrelated with  it ξ  in all 
periods, or strictly exogenous.  
In a second version, the first-differences regression model, the unobserved effect is 
eliminated by subtracting the observation for the previous time period from the 
observation for the current time period, for all time periods, and we obtain: 
1
k
it it j jit it
j
DEV FO Control β λδ
=
Δ= Δ + Δ + + Δ ∑ ξ                                (4.3) 
and again the unobserved heterogeneity has disappeared. OLS is unbiased if the first 
difference of explanatory variable and  it ξ Δ  is uncorrelated at time t, this is a weaker 
assumption than strict exogeneity assumption of fixed effects estimator. Serial 
correlation arises because of first differencing ( 1 () it it E 0 ξ ξ − Δ Δ≠ ). We report robust 
standard error in our results.  
 
Dynamic Panel Data Models 
 
We include lagged dependent variable   in the right hand side of the equation  it DEV
11
nk
it i s it s it j jit it
sj
DEV DEV FO Control t α θβ λ δ −
==
=+ + + ++ ∑∑ ξ         (4.4) 
  16Adding dynamics to a model in this fashion is a major change in the interpretation of 
the equation. β   represents the short run effect of financial openness on financial 
development, any measured influence of financial openness is conditioned on the 
history controlled with the lagged dependent variable. In this case, any impact of the 
explanatory variable represents the effect of new information. The lagged dependent 
variable is correlated with the disturbance, the within-group estimator applied to a 
dynamic model is biased, this is referred to as Nickell bias, the size of the bias 
declines as T increases. We apply the Arellano-Bond (1991) Dynamic Panel Data 




it s it s it j jit it
sj
DEV DEV FO Control θ βλ δ −
==
Δ= Δ + Δ + Δ + + Δ ∑∑ ξ           (4.5) 
 
We have removed group effects and time trend. The transformed error term 
1 it it it ξ ξξ − Δ=−   is correlated with  11 it it it DEV DEV DEV − − Δ =−  because  the  first 
expression implies   depends on the error term 1 it DEV − 1 it ξ − , and this means we have a 
statistical endogeneity problem. Although the first-differenced errors are correlated 
with the first difference of the lagged dependent variable, they may be uncorrelated 
with lagged levels of the dependent variable dated t-2 and earlier. The lagged levels 
may be used as instruments for the first difference of the lagged dependent variable. 
This suggests the use of a GMM estimator, using moment conditions of the following 
form:  
[ ] 0 it s it ED E V ξ − Δ=  for                                   (4.6)  2 s ≥
 
We allow maximum of 2 or 4 lags of levels to be used as instruments. This can help to 
avoid the overfitting biases that are sometimes associated with using all the available 
(linear) moment conditions. If we want to allow for the possibility that   and 
 are not strictly exogenous, we can again instrument using lagged levels 




Two key tests are serial correlation test derived by Arellano and Bond (1991) and 
Sargan test of the over-identifying restriction. The null hypothesis assumes no serial 
  17correlation in it ξ . Arellano and Bond (1991) introduce tests for serial correlation, often 
labelled “m1” for first-order and “m2” for second-order serial correlation. We expect 
to find first-order serial correlation in the first differenced residuals because 
1 it it it ξ ξξ − Δ=−  and  11 it it it 2 ξ ξξ −− Δ=− −  both  contain 1 it ξ − . The key problem arises if 
there is second or higher order serial correlation, as this would suggest that some of 
the moment conditions are invalid. We also use a Sargan-type test (also known in the 
GMM context as Hansen’s J test) to assess the model specification and over-
identifying restrictions, whether the instruments, as a group, appear exogenous. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
We discuss panel data regression results in this section. All variables in our regression 
models except time are standardized so that slope coefficients on different explanatory 
variables are comparable. Our financial development measures in empirical results are 
the first principal component index measures FD (financial system development), BD 
(banking development), and SMD (stock market development) introduced in the last 
section. In order to examine the effects of financial openness on financial 
development, empirical tests are first carried out with individual indicators of 
financial openness, with our results reported in table 3 to 6. We then look at aggregate 
measures of financial openness FO (financial openness index), EFO (equally 
weighted financial openness index), and SMO (stock market openness index) 
described in the last section, test results are in table 7, 8, and 9. Three types of 
estimators are involved in our empirical work: fixed-effects estimator with levels and 
OLS estimator with first differenced variables in static models, and Arellano-Bond 
DIF-GMM estimator in dynamic models. Our results generally suggest financial 
openness is a significant and important determinant of financial development. When 
isolating banking sector and stock market development effects, our findings are robust 
for stock market development throughout different estimators and financial openness 
measures. The effects on banking sector development do not appear to be robust, 
although in most cases we obtain the expected positive signs. This may suggest some 
of our openness measures are inappropriate for banking sector, rather than the absence 
of the link between financial openness and bank development. We now discuss our 
results in details. 
  18Individual Indicators of Financial Openness 
 
Table 3 presents our results with stock market investibility ratio, market capitalization 
of IFC investible index to global index, as indicator of financial openness, estimates 
of slope coefficients on standardized explanatory variables are reported together with 
t-statistics in brackets. Our t-statistics are based on robust standard errors. Fixed-
effects estimators are reported in the first 3 columns. P-value associated with group 
effects tests in all 3 regression models are zero, suggesting significant heterogeneity 
among our sample countries, this implies pooled OLS estimator will be biased and 
inappropriate. Twenty four countries are covered in our regressions and on average 
over a 12-year period. The observed slope coefficients and their t-statistics suggest 
financial openness (stock market investibility ratio, calculated as market 
capitalizations of IFC investible index divided by IFC global index) is significant 
determinant of overall financial system development (FD) and stock market 
development (SMD), but not for bank development index (BD). Financial openness 
appears to be the second most influential factor that determines financial development 
after real per capita GDP, and as important as trade openness. Since variables are 
standardized, slope coefficients (partial effects) of financial openness on FD and SMD 
may be interpreted as follows: a unit standard deviation increase of financial openness 
corresponds to 0.125 standard deviation increase of financial system development 
(FD) and 0.201 standard deviation increase of stock market development (SMD). Both 
positive effects are 1% significant. Results of Pool OLS estimators with first 
differenced variables are then reported in column 4 to 6. Basic implications may be 
interpreted similarly as the previous three columns, and our model captures around 
20% of variations in financial development (R-squired equals to 0.238 and 0.197).  
 
Column 7, 8, and 9 of table 3 report test results of Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data 
model with the DIF-GMM estimator. Estimates of slope coefficient now represent 
gradual adjustments of financial development to new information about explanatory 
variables, after controlling for lagged dependent variables in the right hand size of our 
models. The financial openness effects are positive and significant on both banking 
sector measure (BD) and stock market (SMD), with slopes equal to 0.051 and 0.087. 
In column 7, the impact of financial openness on financial system development (FD) 
remains positive however it is only 10% significant. Sargan test p-values basically 
  19suggest our instruments as a group are exogenous. The null hypothesis of serial 
correlation tests assumes no serial correlation. First order serial correlations (m1) are 
expected because of first differencing, p-values obtained suggest no significant second 
order serial correlation (m2).  
 
Our control variables generally have significant impact on financial development 
indices FD (financial system development), BD (bank development), and SMD (stock 
market development), although throughout all our tables their impact are sometimes 
not robust to all model specifications and estimation methods, and inconsistencies 
exist. Yet still our results may suggest their role in determining cross country 
differences of financial development, and our findings are in general consistent with 
the literature. Our models suggest real per capita GDP is a significant and the most 
important determinant of financial development, its impact is positive and strongest in 
most cases when comparing across slope coefficients on explanatory variables. Trade 
openness (import plus export as percentage of GDP) and ICRG country risk rating 
(proxy for institutions, higher rating means lower risk) appear in most cases to be 
significant, and their slope coefficients are usually positive when significant. A few 
exceptions where we have negative signs are the regressions involving bank 
development (BD) as dependent variable. It is possible that the inconsistency is 
caused by specification problems in our models if some of our financial openness 
indicators are inappropriate for banking sector. This becomes more obvious for the 
other control variable GDP growth rate, and the sign of its slope is always negative 
when the dependent variable is BD. It is however unlikely that those countries in our 
sample with higher growth of GDP have less developed banking sector, after we have 
already controlled for their real per capita GDP in the models.  
 
Table 4 reports empirical results with the second stock market investibility ratio, 
number of stocks in IFC investible index to global index, as measure of financial 
openness. The positive link between financial openness and financial development is 
strong and highly significant in all nine regressions, including when regressed against 
bank development (BD). Static models with fixed-effects estimator or Pooled OLS 
estimator using first differenced variables yield similar slope coefficients on the 
financial openness measure. One standard deviation increase of our stock investibility 
ratio corresponds to 0.23 or 0.35 standard deviation increase of FD, 0.14 or 0.15 
  20standard deviation increase of BD, and 0.21 or 0.25 standard deviation increase of 
SMD. The short run impact of financial openness on financial development in our 
dynamic model with DIF-GMM estimator is reported in the last 3 columns of table 4. 
The positive impact (0.098, 0.092, and 0.127) is consistent with results in previous 
columns with static models, and robust against different financial development 
measures FD, BD, and SMD. Sargan tests and tests of serial correlation do not identify 
serious problems with the group of instruments used. 
 
The regressions in table 5 use our third indicator of financial openness, gross foreign 
direct investment as percentage of GDP. The results generally suggest a positive 
relationship between this indicator and financial development, however they appear to 
be statistically insignificant. The absence of any statistically significant link between 
direct investment and financial development may reflect the fact that although direct 
investment represent huge portion of cross border capital flows, this type of foreign 
capital is usually tied to particular enterprises or projects, and unlikely to enter 
emerging financial markets through either banks or stock markets, providing a source 
of finance that may be accessed by any firms. Therefore, direct investment has 
insignificant impact on size or efficiency of financial systems.  
 
Our fourth indicator of financial openness is also related to capital flows, and it is 
gross private capital flows as percentage of GDP. Regression results with this fourth 
financial openness measures are reported in table 6. Gross private capital flows are the 
sum of the absolute values of direct, portfolio, and other investment inflows and 
outflows recorded in the balance of payments financial account. Although this 
indicator still involves direct investment, again we find statistically significant and 
positive links between financial openness and financial system development (FD) and 
stock market development (SMD), however not for bank development (BD). 
Comparing across slope coefficients on explanatory variables, we found our fourth 
indicator of financial openness having relatively strong influence on stock market 
development than on the entire financial system. The significance may reflect that 
cross border portfolio investment in stock markets has promoted development of local 
stock markets of emerging economies, through increasing stock market capitalization, 
and more active trading activities responding to efficient and timely information, not 
only local but more and more importantly global.  
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The first aggregate index measure of financial openness we look at is the first 
principal component of the four individual indicators, namely FO. In order to examine 
the link between financial openness and financial development, similar model 
specifications and estimation methods are applied, and regression results are reported 
in table 7. Again, the p-value associated with the tests of group effects shows highly 
significant heterogeneity among our sample emerging economies. Number of groups 
(countries) included in table 7 regressions is limited to 16 and 18 due to the method of 
aggregating four openness indicators with principal component analysis. Columns 1 to 
6 of this table are static model results, with fixed effects estimates and first 
differenced Pooled OLS estimates. As in previous tables with individual financial 
openness indicators, impact of financial openness index FO on financial system 
development (FD) and stock market development (SMD) is positive and highly 
significant. We may also notice that the size of the impact, or the slope coefficients on 
FO, differs substantially, this however is probably due to different estimation methods. 
Comparing slopes on explanatory variables and in different columns, FO appears 
more influential to FD and SMD with first differenced OLS estimator than with fixed 
effects estimator. Our model captures around 24% of the variation in FD and 22% in 
SMD. We do not find significant impact on bank development index (BD), and this is 
consistent with static model results with 3 out of 4 individual financial openness 
indicators. This also indicates that our financial openness indicators are more 
appropriate for stock market and at least some of them maybe inappropriate for 
banking sector. Measures like foreign ownership of bank assets or number of foreign 
banks may be much better proxies for banking sector openness, however we do not 
have such data for a large number of emerging economies.  
 
Dynamic model with DIF-GMM estimator results are reported in the last 3 columns of 
table 7. The short run impact, which represents gradual adjustments, of FO on 
financial development indices FD (0.055) and SMD (0.201) are positive and 
significant. In all our tables, maximum of 2 or 4 lagged levels are used as instruments 
for first differenced dependent variable and predetermined variables. Sargan tests and 
serial correlation tests of column 7 and 9 do not suggest any problem with the group 
of instruments we specified. Although in column 8 financial openness (FO) has a 
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order serial correlation test suggest the group of instruments may be invalid.  
 
Empirical results with equally weighted financial openness index (EFO) are reported 
in table 8. Heterogeneity still appears to be significant. The number of groups 
substantially increased and observations almost double those of table 7, due to 
averaging available standardized individual indicators of financial openness to create 
EFO. Slope coefficients on EFO are not very different from the ones on FO in table 7, 
and again with static models in columns 1 to 6 we have positive and significant slopes 
on EFO against financial development indices FD and SMD, but not BD. Around 20% 
of the variance of FD and SMD are explained by our models. In the last 3 columns of 
table 8, EFO has highly significant and positive impact on all three financial 
development indices FD, BD, and SMD with dynamic specification and DIF-GMM 
estimators. The coefficient (measuring short run impact) on stock market (0.141) 
seems stronger than on banking sector (0.073).  
 
Our third aggregate measure of financial openness SMO (stock market openness) 
focus on the stock market only, and the first principal component of two investibility 
ratio is effectively the average of them after being standardized. Regression results 
using SMO are reported in table 9. Impact of SMO on financial development indices 
FD and SMD are roughly the same in columns 1 to 6 under static model specification, 
and we have positive and significant slope coefficients. Comparing with slopes on 
other explanatory variables in our models, the influence of SMO is strong if not the 
strongest. When regressed against bank development (BD), our results in column 2 
and 5 are not robust to the two types of estimation methods. The fixed effects estimate 
0.080 is significant in column 2, but much smaller than the impact against FD and 
SMD in column 1 and 3. Column 5 slope on SMO is still positive, however 
insignificant, and R-squared of this regression is only12.3%. With dynamic models 
and DIF-GMM estimators, our results in the last three columns of table 9 suggest that 
the short run impact on three types of financial development indices FD, BD, and 
SMD are almost the same. We have significant slope coefficient of 0.072, 0.091, and 
0.078. In other words, conditional on past levels (2 lags) of financial development, 
level of financial development (FD, BD, and SMD) increase by 0.07 to 0.09 standard 
deviations in response to one standard deviation increase of stock market openness 
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In this paper, we examine the link between financial openness and financial 
development in major emerging markets with significant stock market. With a large 
group of indicators of financial development including banking system and stock 
market, some sort of aggregate measures are needed to capture the multi-dimensional 
nature of financial development. Our aggregation method involves a simple 
application of principal component analysis, and uses the first principal component of 
a group of financial development indicators as the index measure (FD, BD, and SMD). 
The similar weights on each individual indicator when scoring first principal 
components further convince us that using this type of aggregate measure is more 
appropriate than using a few indicators separately. Financial openness also takes 
different forms in different areas of emerging market financial systems. Four 
indicators of financial openness used in this paper are: stock market investibility ratio 
based on market capitalization or number of stocks of IFC investible index and global 
index, gross foreign direct investment as percentage of GDP, and gross private capital 
flows as percentage of GDP. Similar with the group of financial development 
indicators, we score first principal component of four financial openness indicators as 
aggregate index measure of financial openness (FO). In addition, we also calculate 
equally weighted financial openness index (EFO) by averaging available indicators.  
 
Panel data regressions are carried out first with individual indicators of financial 
openness against indices of financial development, then with aggregate index 
measures of financial openness. We control for trade openness, country risk ratings, 
GDP growth rates, and real per capita GDP in our models. The effect of financial 
openness, except when measured by gross foreign direct investment as a percentage of 
GDP, on stock market development appears to be strong and robust under both static 
and dynamic model specifications. We apply three types of estimation procedures --- 
fixed effects, first differenced OLS, and DIF-GMM. For banking sector development, 
we also have some significant findings that financial openness promotes bank 
  24development, however this does not appear to be robust. The overall level of financial 
development concerning both banking sector and stock market is also significantly 
affected by financial openness indicators, and it is likely that stock market played an 
important role in picking up the positive effect. Regressions with aggregate index 
measures of financial openness yield results consistent with individual indicators, and 
are possibly driven by stock market investibility ratios in some cases. We realize that 
at least some of our indicators of financial openness may be inappropriate for 
measuring banking sector openness, and this might cause measurement error and 
model specification problem that have affected our results. But “ideal” indicators such 
as foreign ownership of banks are not available for large group of emerging 
economies. It is our hope that better indicators of banking sector openness become 





  25References 
 
 
Abdul Abiad, N. Oomes, and K. Ueda (2004). “The quality effect: Does financial 
liberalization improve the allocation of capital?” IMF Working paper 04/112. 
 
Aizenman, Joshua (2002). “Financial opening: Evidence and policy options,” NBER 
Working Paper No. 8900. 
 
Arteta, Carlos, Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz (2001). “When does capital 
account liberalization help more than it hurts?” NBER Working Paper No. 8414. 
 
Arellano, M. (2003). “Panel data econometrics,” Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Beck, T., A. Demirguc-Kunt, and R. Levine (2000). “A new database on the structure 
and development of the financial sector,” World Bank Economic Review, 14(3), 597-
605. 
 
Beck, T., A. Demirguc-Kunt, and R. Levine (2003), “Law, endowments, and finance,” 
Journal of Financial Economics, 70, 137-181. 
 
Beck, Torsten, and Ross Levine (2002). “Industry growth and capital allocation: 
Does having a market- or bank-based system matter?” Journal of Financial 
Economics 64, 147-180. 
 
Beim, David, and Charles W. Calomiris (2001). Emerging Financial Markets, New 
York: McGraw Hill. 
 
Bekaert G., C. Harvey (2000), “Foreign speculators and emerging equity markets,” 
The Journal of Finance, Vol. LV, No.2. 
 
Bekaert G., C. Harvey (2003), “Emerging markets finance,” Journal of Empirical 
Finance (10) 3-55. 
 
Bekaert G., C. Harvey, and Lundblad C. (2001). “Does financial liberalization spur 
growth?” NBER Working Paper. 
 
Bekaert G., C. Harvey, and Lundblad C. (2000). “Emerging equity market and 
economic development,” NBER Working Paper No. 7763. 
 
Bekaert G. (1995), “Market integration and investment barriers in emerging equity 
markets,” The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 9, No.1: 75-107. 
 
Chinn, M.D. and Ito, H. (2002), “Capital account liberalization, institutions and 
financial development: cross country evidence,” NBER working paper No. 8967.  
 
Chinn, M.D. and Ito, H. (2005), “What matters for financial development? Capital 
controls, institutions, and interactions,” NBER working paper No. 11370. 
 
  26Chinn, M.D. (2001), “The compatibility of capital controls and financial development: 
a selective survey and empiricalevidence,” NBER Working Paper. 
 
Claessen, Stijn, Demirguc-Kunt, and H. Huizinga (2001). “How does foreign affect 
domestic banking markets?” Journal of Banking and Finance, 25, 891-911. 
 
Demirguc-Kunt, A. and R. Levine (1996), “Stock markets, corporate finance and 
economic growth: an overview,” Work Bank Economic Review, 10(2), 223-240. 
 
Demirguc-Kunt, A. and R. Levine (1999), “Bank-based and market based financial 
systems: cross-country comparisons”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 2143. 
 
De Gregorio, Jose (1998), “Financial integration, financial development and 
economic growth,” mimeo (Universidad de Chile, July). 
 
Edison, Hali J., Michael W. Klein, Luca Ricci, and T. Slok, (2002). “Capital account 
liberalization and economic performance: a review of the literature,” mimeo 
(Washington, D.C.: IMF, May). 
 
Edison, Hali J. and Francis E. Warnock (2001). “A simple measure of the intensity of 
capital controils,” Internatioal Finance Discussion Paper no.708 (Washington, D.C.: 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, September). 
 
Jain-Chandra S. (2002), “The impact of stock market liberalization on liquidity and 
efficiency in emerging stock markets,” Columbia University working paper. 
 
Henry, P.B. (2000), “Stock market liberalization, economic reform, and emerging 
market equity prices,” The Journal of Finance, Vol.55, No.2, 529-564. 
 
Henry, P.B. (2003), “Capital-account liberalization, the cost of capital, and economic 
growth,” American Economic Review, 93(2), 91-96. 
 
Henry, P.B. (2003), “Commentary on Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad’s Equity market 
liberalization in emerging equity markets,” Stanford Graduate School of Business, 
Research Paper Series No.1783. 
 
Huang Y. and J. Temple (2005), “Does external trade promote financial 
development?” University of Bristol, Working paper series. 
 
Ito, Hiro (2004). “Is financial openness a bad thing? An analysis on the correlation 
between financial liberalization and the output performance of crisis-hit economics” 
UCSC Working paper Series. 
 
Kaminsky, Graciela, and Sergio Schmuker (2002). “ Short-run pain, long-run gain: 
the effects of financial liberalization,” World Bank Working Paper No.2912. 
 
Kim E. Han, Vijay Singal (2000), “Stock markets openings: experience of emerging 
economies,” The Journal of Business, Vol. 73, No.1, 25-66. 
 
  27King, R.G. and R. Levine(1993), “Finance and Growth: Schumpeter might be right,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108:717-737. 
 
Klein M, G. Olivei (2001), “Capital account liberalization, financial depth and 
economic growth,” mimeo (Medford, MA: Tufts). 
 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. Shleifer, and Vishny, R.W. (1998), “Law and 
finance,” Journal of Political Economy, 106: 1113-1155. 
 
Law, S.H. and Demetriades, P. (2005), “Openness, institutions and financial 
development,” University of Leicester, working paper no. 05/08. 
 
Levine, R. (1997), “Financial development and economic growth: views and agenda,” 
Journal of Economic Literature, 35: 668-726. 
 
Levine, R. N. Loayza, and T. Beck (2000), “Financial intermediation and growth: 
Causality and causes,” Journal of Manetary Economics 46: 31-77. 
 
Levine, R. (2005), “Finance and growth: theory and evidence,” Handbok of 
Economic Growth, North-Holland, forthcoming. 
 
Mayer, C. and O. Sussman (2001), “The assessment: finance, law and growth,” 
Oxford Review of Economic Polisy, 17(4). 
 
Mckinnon, Ronald I. (1973). “Money and capital in economic development,” 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution). 
 
Quinn, Dennis (1997), “The correlates of change in international financial 
regulation,” American Political Science Review 19(3): 531-551. 
 
Rajan, R.G. and Zingales, L. (2003). “The great reversals: the politics of financial 
development in the twentieth century,” Journal of Financial Economics, 69, 5-59. 
 
Shaw, Edward (1973). Financial deepening in economic development. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Stiglitz, Joseph (2000), “Capital market liberalization, economic growth, and 
instability,” World Dvelopment, 28:6, p.1075-1086. 
 
Stultz, Rene (1999), “Globalization, corporate finance and the cost of capital,” 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, v12(3), 8-25. 
  28  29




Panel A: Summary of financial openness indicators 
 
Financial Openness Indicators  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Stock Market Inv. (MC)  355  65.93 29.96 3.11  100
Stock Market Inv. (NUM)  355  62.69 29.25 7.62  100
Gross FDI / GDP  532  0.00 1.24 -4.61  4.02
Gross Private Capital Flows / GDP  557  1.86 0.93 -1.00  4.49
 
 














Stock Market Inv. (MC)  1.00          
Stock Market Inv. (NUM)  0.49  1.00    
Gross FDI / GDP  0.30  0.25 1.00   




Stock Market Inv. (MC) is the stock market investibility ratio calculated as market 
capitalisation of IFC Investible index divided by market capitalization of IFC Global 
index, for emerging market i at time t, data available from S&P Emerging market 
Database. Stock Market Inv. (NUM) is stock market investibility ratio calculated as 
number of stocks in IFC Investible index divided by number of stocks in IFC Global 
index, for emerging market i at time t, data available from S&P Emerging Market 
Database. Gross FDI / GDP is gross foreign direct investment (inflow + outflow) as a 
percentage of GDP, data obtained from World Bank Online Database. Gross Private 
Capital Flows / GDP is gross private capital flows (inflow + outflow) as a percentage 
of GDP, data obtained from World Bank Online Database. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Indicators are collected as percentage values, for example a ratio of 0.25 is collected as 25. 
Natural logarithms of some variables are taken to reduce the effects of outliers in empirical 
analysis. Panel C: Summary of financial development indicators 
 
Financial Development Indicators  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
LN(private credit to GDP)  814  4.08  0.70 2.00 5.69
Deposite VS. Central Bank Asset  823  80.80  16.00 16.19 99.97
LN(total bank assets to GDP)  822  3.81  0.63 2.00 5.04
Liquid Liability to GDP  792  45.35  23.27 7.64 100.00
LN(stock market cap. to GDP)  742  2.63  1.40 -2.00 5.64
LN(stock market turnover)  731  3.01  1.43 -2.00 6.27






















LN(private credit to GDP)  1.00                
Deposite VS. Central Bank Asset  0.49  1.00        
LN(total bank assets to GDP)  0.77  0.07 1.00      
Liquid Liability to GDP  0.75  0.29 0.72 1.00    
LN(stock market cap. to GDP)  0.53  0.40 0.39 0.48 1.00  
LN(stock market turnover)  0.23  0.33 0.19 0.23 0.28 1.00
LN(stock value traded to GDP)  0.51  0.45 0.40 0.44 0.77 0.80
 




Panel A: First principal component financial openness indices 
 













Financial Openness (FO)  0.53  0.47  0.48  0.53  0.52  219 




Panel B: First principal component financial development indices 
 
  




















Financial Development (FD)  0.56  0.45 0.29 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.27 0.43  605 
Bank Development (BD)  0.67  0.58  0.28  0.53  0.55        711 
Stock Market Development (SMD)  0.74              0.52  0.53  0.67  717 
 
 
                                                 
4 Proportion, the proportion of total variance of the group of variables captured by the first principal component in PCA. The numbers under 
individual measures (indicators) are eigenvectors of the first principal component, and are basically the weights on each standardized variable 
when scoring the first principal component.  
  31 Panel C: Pairwise correlations of index measures 
 
 FO  EFO  SMO  FD  BD  SMD 
FO  1.00       
EFO  0.99  1.00      
SMO  0.79 0.91 1.00       
FD  0.26 0.19 0.08 1.00     
BD 0.20 0.15 0.06 0.92 1.00   
SMD  0.22 0.23 0.22 0.86 0.59 1.00 
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Our standard static model specification with fixed-effects is
1
k
it i it j jit it
j
DEV FO Control t α βλ δ ξ =
=
++ + ∑ + , t = 1, 2 ... T.  (4.1), results are in 
column 1-3.  i α  capture country fixed effects.  is financial development index measure, including Financial System Development (FD), 
Bank Development (BD), and Stock Market Development (SMD).   is financial openness measure (individual indicator or aggregate indices). 
 is the group of control variables, including: 1)  : (Import + Export)/GDP; 2) 
it DEV
it FO
j Control it Trade it ICRG : Natural Logarithms of International 
Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) country risk composite score; 3)  : GDP growth rate; 4) : Natural Logarithms of real per capita 
GDP.  t = 1, 2 ... T, it is a control for time trend in variables.  
it GDPG it PCGDP
 
First Differencing (4.1), we eliminate country effects  i α  and time trend, and have 
1
k
it it j jit it
j
DEV FO Control β λδ ξ Δ          (4.5), results are in column 4 -6. 
=
Δ= Δ + Δ + + ∑
 
Our dynamic model (DIF-GMM) include lagged dependent variable in the right hand side of the model, 
11
nk
it i s it s it j jit it
sj
DEV DEV FO Control t α θβ λ δ ξ −
==
++ + + ∑∑ +          (4.6).  =
We first difference it then estimate model parameters with GMM, results are in column 7-9.  
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5
Estimators Fixed-effects,  level  Pooled OLS, 1st Difference  DIF-GMM 
Column  Number  1  2  3 4 5  6 7 8  9 
Fin. Dev. Index  FD  BD  SMD  FD  BD  SMD  FD  BD  SMD 
Financal Openness  0.125***  0.031  0.201*** 0.136*** -0.024  0.146*** 0.035*  0.051***  0.087*** 
(stock market inv. MC)  (4.06)  (0.93)  (4.32) (3.13) (-0.61) (3.12) (1.71) (4.24)  (3.12) 
Trade 0.194***  0.146***  0.193***  0.150***  0.040  0.119**  0.010  -0.041*  0.043 
  (4.21) (2.93) (2.73)  (3.59)  (0.98) (2.42)  (0.32)  (-1.94)  (0.88) 
ICRG (Country Risk)  0.057**  0.056*  0.020  0.228***  0.061  0.206***  0.077***  0.023***  0.112*** 
  (2.05) (1.90) (0.47)  (4.56)  (1.20) (3.79)  (3.19)  (3.33) (3.63) 
GDP  Growth  -0.012  -0.077*** 0.072*** 0.010  -0.214*** 0.215*** -0.007  -0.060*** 0.061*** 
  (-1.01) (-5.87) (3.78) (0.14) (-3.24) (3.03) (-0.95)  (-8.39) (4.97) 
Real Per Capita GDP  1.662***  1.634***  0.951**  0.230*** 0.228***  0.096**  0.978*** 0.494**  0.059 
  (6.54) (6.01) (2.42)  (5.02)  (6.63) (1.98)  (3.10)  (2.00) (0.09) 
t (Year 1,2,3,...)  -0.066***  0.045**  -0.132             
  (-3.93)  (2.10)  (-6.82)          
No.  of  Obs.  290  290  320 290 290  320 248 253  273 
No. of Groups  24  24  26        24  24  26 
R-squared       0.238  0.118  0.197      
P-value, group effects F test  0.00  0.00  0.00             
Lags of Dependant Var.              2  2  2 
Sargan Test P-value              0.96  0.95  0.74 
Serial Corr. (m1) P-value              0.03  0.03  0.17 
Serial Corr. (m2) P-value                    0.42  0.11  0.15 
                                                 
5 *** indicate significance at 99% confidence level, ** indicate significance at 95% confidence level, * indicate significance at 90% confidence level. The 
numbers in brackets are t-statistics.  Financial openness in this table is measured with the stock market investibility ratio, Stock Market Inv. (MC), calculated 
as market capitalisation of IFC Investible index divided by market capitalization of IFC Global index. 
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Table 4: Financial Openness Indicator 2 and Financial Development 
Estimators Fixed-effects,  level  Pooled OLS, 1st Difference  DIF-GMM 
Column  Number  1 2  3  4 5  6 7 8  9 
Fin. Dev. Index  FD  BD  SMD  FD  BD  SMD  FD  BD  SMD 
Financal Openness
6 0.226*** 0.148***  0.212***  0.347*** 0.141***  0.246*** 0.098*** 0.092***  0.127** 
(stock market inv. NUM)  (7.21)  (4.25) (4.54) (7.94)  (2.85) (4.67)  (3.93)  (7.39) (5.19) 
Trade  0.165*** 0.121**  0.177***  0.137  0.034  0.114*** 0.001  -0.024  0.081** 
  (3.78)  (2.46) (2.50) (3.92)  (0.83) (2.50)  (0.03)  (-1.18)  (2.10) 
ICRG (Country Risk)  0.038  0.048*  -0.014  0.163***  0.043  0.154***  0.059***  0.013**  0.095*** 
  (1.46) (1.68)  (-0.32) (3.58) (0.83)  (2.88) (2.54) (1.95)  (3.83) 
GDP  Growth  -0.005  -0.072*** 0.078  0.016  -0.210*** 0.215*** 0.008*  -0.063*** 0.053** 
  (-0.45) (-5.65)  (4.11)  (0.26)  (-3.18)  (3.16)  (-1.71) (-8.32)  (4.93) 
Real Per Capita GDP  0.921***  1.104***  0.429  0.179***  0.197***  0.070 0.271 0.766***  -0.141 
  (3.48)  (3.78) (1.03) (3.97)  (5.59) (1.34)  (1.02)  (10.07)  (-0.32) 
t (Year 1,2,3,...)  -0.036**  0.068***  -0.104***             
  (-2.23)  (3.03)  (-5.62)          
No.  of  Obs.  290 290  320  290 290  320 248 253  273 
No. of Groups  24  24  26        24  24  26 
R-squared       0.345  0.146  0.237      
P-value, group effects F test  0.00  0.00  0.00             
Lags of Dependant Var.              2  2  2 
Sargan Test P-value              0.92  0.80  0.80 
Serial Corr. (m1) P-value              0.09  0.01  0.15 
Serial Corr. (m2) P-value                    0.16  0.16  0.18 
                                                 
6 Financial openness in this table is measured with the stock market investibility ratio, Stock Market Inv. (NUM), calculated as number of stocks in IFC 
Investible index divided by number of stocks in IFC Global index. 
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Table 5: Financial Openness Indicator 3 and Financial Development 
Estimators Fixed-effects,  level  Pooled OLS, 1st Difference  DIF-GMM 
Column  Number  1 2  3 4 5  6 7 8  9 
Fin. Dev. Index  FD  BD  SMD  FD  BD  SMD  FD  BD  SMD 
Financal Openness
7 0.046 0.016  0.044 0.034 -0.090 0.117 0.034 0.016  0.066 
(Gross FDI / GDP)  (1.32) (0.44)  (0.95) (0.43) (-1.19) (1.62) (1.21) (0.90)  (1.52) 
Trade 0.003  -0.175**  0.286***  0.083*  0.016  0.100**  -0.089  -0.051  0.112 
  (0.04) (-2.28) (2.83) (1.78) (0.40)  (2.18) (-1.24)  (-1.26)  (1.03) 
ICRG (Country Risk)  0.102**  -0.028  0.205***  0.183***  -0.024  0.211***  0.075***  -0.038*  0.183*** 
  (3.10) (-0.82) (4.60) (2.57) (-0.40) (3.28) (2.58) (-1.88)  (4.30) 
GDP  Growth  -0.014 -0.061***  0.048**  -0.110 -0.308***  0.208***  0.038* -0.037**  0.059*** 
  (-0.85) (3.61)  (2.21)  (-1.24) (-4.28)  (2.71)  (1.87)  (-2.36)  (2.14) 
Real Per Capita GDP  0.778**  0.225  1.265***  0.288***  0.211***  0.174***  -1.185  0.221  -1.71 
  (2.23) (0.61)  (2.70) (5.89) (5.38)  (3.58) (-1.31)  (0.30)  (-1.28) 
t (Year 1,2,3,...)  0.067***  0.137***  -0.040             
  (3.04)  (5.18)  (-1.40)          
No.  of  Obs.  290 292  331 290 292  331 263 274  305 
No. of Groups  16  16  18        16  16  18 
R-squared        0.135 0.115  0.173      
P-value, group effects F test  0.00  0.00  0.00             
Lags of Dependant Var.              2  2  2 
Sargan  Test  P-value          1.00  1.00  1.00 
Serial Corr. (m1) P-value              0.92  0.81  0.13 
Serial Corr. (m2) P-value                    0.61  0.70  0.08 
                                                 
7 Financial openness in this table is measured with gross foreign direct investment (inflow + outflow) as a percentage of GDP, Gross FDI / GDP. 
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Table 6: Financial Openness Indicator 4 and Financial Development 
Estimators Fixed-effects,  level  Pooled OLS, 1st Difference  DIF-GMM 
Column  Number  1 2 3 4 5  6 7  8  9 
Fin. Dev. Index  FD  BD  SMD  FD  BD  SMD  FD  BD  SMD 
Financal Openness
8 0.063**  0.010  0.220*** 0.130**  -0.022  0.145*** 0.040** 0.012  0.095*** 
(Gross Private Capital Flows / GDP)  (2.27)  (0.34)  (4.01) (2.38) (-0.39) (3.15) (2.16)  (0.83)  (2.74) 
Trade -0.019  -0.178**  0.047 0.061 0.010  0.086**  -0.110  0.013  -0.017 
 (-0.26)  (-2.34)  (0.70) (1.38) (0.24)  (2.07) (-0.66)  (0.30)  (-0.22) 
ICRG (Country Risk)  0.102***  -0.022  -0.034  0.174*** -0.027  0.206*** 0.056** -0.009  0.143*** 
 (3.30)  (-0.67)  (-0.61)  (2.48) (-0.46) (3.45) (2.25)  (-0.30)  (3.62) 
GDP Growth  -0.017  -0.063***  0.222*** -0.118  -0.299*** 0.195*** 0.015  -0.080** 0.095** 
 (-1.11)  (-3.85)  (5.05) (-1.37)  (-4.23) (2.64) (0.93)  (-2.25)  (2.23) 
Real Per Capita GDP  0.820**  0.194  0.997*** 0.298*** 0.200***  0.193*** -1.107  1.62  -2.084 
 (2.42)  (0.54)  (4.40) (6.32) (5.22)  (3.91) (-1.47)  (1.00)  (-1.19) 
t (Year 1,2,3,...)  0.068***  0.137***  0.063***           
 (3.19)  (5.21)  (7.24)           
No. of Obs.  298  300  357 298 300  339 271  282  313 
No. of Groups  16  16  18      16  16  18 
R-squared       0.150 0.107  0.184      
P-value, group effects F test  0.00  0.00  0.00           
Lags of Dependant Var.              2  2  2 
Sargan Test P-value              0.84  1.00  0.71 
Serial Corr. (m1) P-value              0.58  0.24  0.07 
Serial Corr. (m2) P-value                    0.84  0.62  0.43 
                                                 
8 Financial openness in this table is measured with gross private capital flows (inflow + outflow) as a percentage of GDP, Gross Private Capital Flows / GDP. 
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Table 7: Financial Openness Index (FO) and Financial Development 
Estimators Fixed-effects,  level  Pooled OLS, 1st Difference  DIF-GMM 
Column  Number  1 2 3  4 5  6 7  8  9 
Fin. Dev. Index  FD  BD  SMD  FD  BD  SMD  FD  BD  SMD 
Financal Openness (FO)
9 0.073*** 0.044  0.093**  0.203*** 0.028  0.145**  0.055** 0.035**  0.201*** 
  (2.62) (0.92) (2.23)  (3.44) (0.52)  (2.05) (1.96)  (2.41)  (3.81) 
Trade 0.244***  0.121**  0.429***  0.088  -0.003  0.104**  0.087  0.132**  0.156* 
  (3.45) (1.98) (3.88)  (1.58) (-0.06) (2.01) (1.07)  (2.43)  (1.86) 
ICRG (Country Risk)  -0.003  -0.077  0.048  0.073  -0.176***  0.234***  0.038  -0.024  0.052 
  (-0.08)  (-1.51)  (0.91)  (1.32) (-3.36) (3.36) (1.16)  (-0.79) (1.36) 
GDP  Growth  0.008 -0.026  0.083***  0.051 -0.156***  0.214**  0.017  -0.040***  0.089*** 
  (0.57) (-0.65)  (3.44)  (0.66) (-2.52) (2.32) (1.27)  (-3.29) (2.72) 
Real Per Capita GDP  2.015***  0.977***  1.85***  0.309*** 0.257***  0.170*** -0.400  0.057  -1.000 
  (6.25) (3.88) (3.60)  (6.29) (6.45)  (2.92) (-0.49)  (0.13)  (-0.71) 
t (Year 1,2,3,...)  -0.038*  0.030***  -0.121***             
  (-1.85)  (3.14)  (-5.49)           
No.  of  Obs.  198 214 228  198 198  228 171  171  193 
No. of Groups  16  16  18        16  16  18 
R-squared        0.237 0.179  0.222      
P-value, group effects F test  0.00  0.00  0.00             
Lags of Dependant Var.              2  2  2 
Sargan  Test  P-value          0.86  1.00  0.70 
Serial Corr. (m1) P-value              0.96  0.58  0.22 
Serial Corr. (m2) P-value                    0.24  0.09  0.18 
                                                 
9  Financial openness in this table is an aggregate index measure FO, calculated as the first principal component of four individual financial openness 
measures in table 3 -6. 
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Table 8: Financial Openness Index (EFO) and Financial Development 
Estimators Fixed-effects,  level  Pooled OLS, 1st Difference  DIF-GMM 
Column  Number  1 2  3 4 5  6 7 8  9 
Fin. Dev. Index  FD  BD  SMD  FD  BD  SMD  FD  BD  SMD 
Financal Openness (EFO)
10 0.084*** 0.048*  0.103*** 0.164*** 0.038  0.176*** 0.120*** 0.073***  0.141*** 
  (3.53) (1.87)  (3.14) (3.12) (0.80)  (2.96) (8.24) (17.77) (3.57) 
Trade  0.105**  0.010  0.188*** 0.131*** 0.039  0.107*** -0.034  -0.015  -0.062 
  (2.03) (0.18)  (2.60) (3.59) (1.10)  (2.59) (-1.29)  (-0.89) (-1.22) 
ICRG  (Country  Risk)  0.129*** 0.046*  0.172*** 0.251*** 0.113**  0.177*** 0.086*** 0.032***  0.155*** 
  (4.84) (1.65)  (4.68) (4.59) (2.24)  (3.60) (4.43) (4.01)  (4.71) 
GDP  Growth  -0.018 -0.071***  0.055***  -0.071 -0.287***  0.219***  -0.018**  -0.072***  0.065*** 
  (-1.39) (-5.00)  (3.03)  (-0.98) (-4.45)  (3.53)  (-2.29) (-6.65)  (3.23) 
Real Per Capita GDP  0.925***  0.736**  0.730*  0.236*** 0.195***  0.121*** 0.113  1.202**  -1.036 
  (3.31) (2.45)  (1.91) (5.57) (5.92)  (2.78) (0.40) (2.40)  (-1.40) 
t (Year 1,2,3,...)  0.022  0.071***  -0.035*             
  (1.34)  (3.15)  (-1.64)          
No.  of  Obs.  390 392  431 390 392  431 348 364  393 
No. of Groups  24  24  26        24  24  26 
R-squared        0.202 0.109  0.180      
P-value, group effects F test  0.00  0.00  0.00             
Lags of Dependant Var.              2  2  2 
Sargan  Test  P-value          0.89  0.97  0.89 
Serial Corr. (m1) P-value              0.00  0.03  0.04 
Serial Corr. (m2) P-value                    0.45  0.20  0.42 
                                                 
10 Financial openness in this table is an aggregate index measure EFO, calculated as average of available individual openness measures in table 3 -6.  
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Table 9: Financial Openness Index (SMO) and Financial Development 
Estimators Fixed-effects,  level  Pooled OLS, 1st Difference  DIF-GMM 
Column  Number  1 2 3 4  5 6  7  8 9 
Fin.  Dev.  Index  FD BD SMD  FD  BD SMD  FD  BD SMD 
Financal Openness (SMO)
11 0.198*** 0.080*** 0.233*** 0.273***  0.064  0.221***  0.072***  0.091*** 0.078** 
  (6.50) (2.89) (5.14) (5.81)  (1.45) (4.11)  (2.82)  (7.02) (2.29) 
Trade  0.173*** 0.132*** 0.175*** 0.143***  0.038  0.114***  -0.022  -0.040  -0.094 
  (3.91) (2.66) (2.50) (3.78)  (0.92) (2.47)  (-0.90)  (-1.13)  (0.47) 
ICRG (Country Risk)  0.051**  0.056**  0.003  0.207***  0.062  0.183***  0.065***  0.019***  0.119*** 
  (1.95) (1.98) (0.07) (4.36)  (1.21) (3.48)  (2.82)  (3.00) (5.40) 
GDP  Growth  -0.008  -0.075*** 0.075***  0.014  -0.212*** 0.215*** -0.009*  -0.059*** 0.051*** 
  (-0.72) (-5.79) (4.03)  (0.21) (-3.21) (3.11) (-1.73)  (-9.15) (5.14) 
Real Per Capita GDP  1.235***  1.403***  0.563  0.196***  0.213***  0.077  0.177  0.163  -0.211 
  (4.86) (5.01) (1.41) (4.25)  (5.99) (1.49)  (0.70)  (0.49) (-0.41) 
t (Year 1,2,3,...)  -0.056***  0.054**  -0.120***             
  (-3.31) (2.42)  (-6.40)            
No.  of  Obs.  290 290 320 290  290 320  248  253 273 
No.  of  Groups  24 24 26       24  24 26 
R-squared     0.300  0.123  0.226      
P-value, group effects F test  0.00  0.00  0.00             
Lags of Dependant Var.              2  2  2 
Sargan  Test  P-value          0.95  0.91  0.76 
Serial Corr. (m1) P-value              0.10  0.07  0.15 
Serial Corr. (m2) P-value                    0.20  0.10  0.21 
                                                 
11 Financial openness in this table is an aggregate index measure SMO, calculated as the first principal component of the two types of stock market 
investibility ratios in table 3 and 4.  
 Appendix 1: Databases 
 
The Emerging Markets Data Base 
 
Stock market data are from Standard & Poor's Emerging Markets Data Base (EMDB). 
With information collected since 1975, EMDB was the first database to track 
emerging stock markets. As of January 2003, EMDB tracked 53 stock markets in 
Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa and the Middle East, providing daily, 
weekly, monthly, quarterly, and yearly data on more than 2,200 stocks by company, 
industry, country, region, and more. Using a selected sample of stocks in each market, 
EMDB calculates indices of stock market performance designed to serve as 
benchmarks consistent across national boundaries. This eliminates the inconsistencies 
that make it difficult to compare locally-produced Indices with differing 
methodologies. 
 
When the first S&P Emerging Markets Indices were calculated in the mid-1980s, 
most developing countries had major restrictions on foreign portfolio investment. The 
first series of indices, the S&P/IFCG (Global) indices, were designed to accurately 
reflect the perspective of local investors. They do not take into consideration 
restrictions on foreign ownership that limit the accessibility of certain markets and 
individual stocks. Their primary use is to gauge and compare local market sizes and 
price movements. Since the mid-1980s, barriers to investment have fallen markedly 
and foreign investment in emerging markets has soared, bringing with it the need for 
an index that reflects new opportunities for foreign investment. Accordingly, Standard 
& Poor's also produces the S&P/IFCI (Investible) Index series, which provide a broad, 
neutral, and historically consistent benchmark for the growing emerging market 
investment community. Methodologies for calculating the S&P/IFCG and S&P/IFCI 
indices are similar. The key difference is that investible indices are adjusted to reflect 
restrictions on foreign investment in emerging markets. S&P/IFCI indices go beyond 
definitions of legal investibility and has applied minimum market capitalization and 
liquidity hurdles for the inclusion of individual stocks. In January 1996, S&P began 
adjusting the capitalization of index constituents to eliminate cross-holdings. The 
adjustments eliminate distortions caused by double-counting of share capitalization, 
thereby reducing the weights of stocks and markets where cross-holding is prevalent. 
  41In November 1996, adjustments to eliminate government holdings were introduced. 
Our sample includes 35 emerging markets with monthly total return indices from 
1976 to 2002, most IFC global indices series start from 1985, and investible index 
series from 1988.  
 
World Bank Online Databases 
 
The World Bank offers multiple databases online. World Development Indicators 
(WDI) is the premiere data source on the global economy. It contains statistical data 
for over 550 development indicators and time series data from 1960-2002 for over 
200 countries and 18 country groups. Data includes social, economic, financial, 
natural resources, and environmental indicators. Global Development Finance (GDF) 
contains statistical data for the 136 countries that report public and publicly-
guaranteed debt to the World Bank Debtor Reporting System. The database covers 
external debt stocks and flows, major economic aggregates, and key debt ratios as 
well as average terms of new commitments, currency composition of long-term debt, 
debt restructuring, and scheduled debt service projections. 
 
Financial Development and Structure Database
12
 
Previously, financial analysts and researchers have relied on a few indicators of the 
banking sector and the stock market, using data from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics and the IFC’s Emerging Market Database. This new database, 
constructed by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, draws on a wider array of sources 
and constructs indicators of the size, activity and efficiency of a much broader set of 
financial institutions and markets. It improves on previous efforts by presenting data 
on the public share of commercial banks, by introducing indicators of the size and 
activity of nonbank financial institutions, and by presenting measures of the size of 
bond and primary equity markets. The database will thus enable financial analysts and 
researchers to compare the level of financial development and the structure of the 
financial sector of a specific country with that of other countries. 
                                                 
12 The database is posted at http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/finstructure/database.html 
  42Appendix 2: The ICRG Risk Components 
 
In total there are 22 risk components in the ICRG System, which are as follows: 
 







Military in Politics 
Religious Tensions 





Financial Risk Components  
Foreign Debt as a Percentage of GDP 
Foreign Debt Service as a Percentage of XGS 
Current Account as a Percentage of XGS 
Net Liquidity as Months of Import Cover 
Exchange Rate Stability 
 
Economic Risk Components  
GDP per Head of Population 
Real Annual GDP Growth 
Annual Inflation Rate 
Budget Balance as a Percentage of GDP 
Current Account Balance as a Percentage of GDP 
 
In calculating the ICRG Composite Risk Rating, the political risk rating contributes 
50% of the composite rating, while the financial and economic ratings each contribute 
25%. 
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